DU MYANMAR AUX PHILIPPINES

 

(Voici une série de messages diffusés sur X -ex-Twitter- au cours des derniers jours)

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(20 mai 2024)

Le gouvernement birman peine à étouffer la rébellion grandissante des minorités ethniques du Myanmar, un phénomène d'une vigueur variable depuis l'indépendance de ce pays, mais encouragée et alimentée par les Anglo-Américains au cours des récentes années. Toutefois, la grande révolte démocratique de la population bamar du Myanmar, très attachée à ses traditions bouddhistes, sur laquelle ils comptaient, tarde à satisfaire leurs attentes. Les gouvernements des États-Unis et du Royaume-Uni travaillent de concert à déstabiliser le Myanmar pour favoriser la formation d'une fédération pro-occidentale qui sortirait ce pays de l'orbite économique et politique de la Chine, son voisin du nord et possible commanditaire du coup d'État ayant remplacé le précédent pouvoir civil par un pouvoir militaire.

https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/war-for-rakhine-myanmar-junta-evacuating-govt-staff-from-southern-towns.html

 

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(23 juin 2024)

Here's an interesting article that goes a long way in explaining the current dispute over the Second Thomas shoal, near Palawan, an elongated island where at least two military bases can now be accessed and used by American forces.

 

That trio of Chinese military bases, arranged in an almost perfect triangular shape, would be able to reinforce each other by their relative proximity and also by the presence of naval, air, and coast guard installations on each.

Those bases would be a strong anchor in any conflict with Anglo-American forces, with or without the succor of outside military units, like Japanese, Australian, Canadian, or others. They are projected deep into the South China Sea but are supported by Chinese forces located on the Paracels archipelago (facing Vietnam) on the west side of the South China Sea. The importance of the geographical position of Scarborough Shoal, facing Luzon on the eastern side of the same body of water, is instantly apparent.

The tunnels that could be built (and probably would be) under each of those three bases already existing on the newly created islands would make them even harder to invade, in the event of an armed conflict, like some sort of Tarawa or Iwo Jima, but on steroids. The Chinese leadership must certainly have analyzed in detail the events of the WW2 Pacific war and drew the relevant lessons to be taken from the experience of Imperial Japan.

The tunnels are a modernized echo of the old American fortifications and tunnels built on (and under) the island-fortress of Corregidor, located at the entrance of Manilla Bay, in what was then the US territory of the Philippines.

The trio of bases, in effect, would became a fixed squadron of unsinkable super-carriers defending the southern end of a vast maritime area Beijing considers its own, by virtue of claims made by the preceding government of mainland China, that is to say the Kuomintang, at the end of WW2, before it had to precipitously retreat from the continent, toward the big islands of Hainan and Taiwan.

Now, in the eyes of Beijing, all that area is officially considered a part of China itself since it is under civilian administration, as a municipality that covers the maritime part of the province of Hainan.

Land wise, Hainan is China's tiniest and newest province, taken by force from the KMT in 1950, a few months after the end of the war on the mainland, and a few years before the creation of the last two states of the United-States of America, Alaska and Hawaii, in the northern and central part of the Pacific.

Taiwan is to the northeast of Hainan, on the island of Formosa, and it is also a relatively new province of China, having been settled from the mainland, with Fukien people seeking to escape taxation from the Chinese Empire, or looking for new lands to cultivate and new fishing grounds to live from.

The nature of the reefs subsurface open the possibility of multiple tunnels, one on top of the other, in vertical layers, possibly like the way China plans to expand its new Earth space station, by multiplying vertically the horizontal plane of its current shape, along a central axis that would then become the corridor of displacement between all the layers.

If there is a Chinese permanently manned station on Mars one day, the most important part may well be underground, not on the surface, constantly exposed to micrometeorites and radiation.

The likelihood of such a station is much greater on Mars than on the Moon, given the enormous difference between Moon gravity and Earth gravity. Because of that difference, a base on the Moon would be somewhat like a scientific base on Antarctica, remote, livable, but not really suitable for permanent mass settlement, only for a cyclical style of occupation, with two or three sets of crewmembers per year, following a three months, four months or six months at a time schedule.

https://www.scmp.com/news/china/science/article/3263487/scientists-propose-tunnels-invisible-island-expansion-south-china-sea

 

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(25 mai 2024)

Having fortified many islands, atolls and shoals in the Paracels and the Spratley’s archipelagoes, to the west and south, it would be very surprising if China doesn't eventually do the very same thing on Scarborough shoal, off Luzon, thus anchoring the eastern side of the maritime corridor leading to the Spratley’s, and giving maritime access the populous countries of Southeast Asia.

 

In its long-term planning, Beijing likely wishes to have a strong defensive position on China's Pacific façade, eventually including Taiwan, and surrounding island (Pratas), since its political, economic, and cultural influence has historically flowed more easily westward than eastward, that is to say toward the deepness of the Eurasian landmass than toward the fastness of oceanic waters.

https://globalnation.inquirer.net/237439/china-monster-ship-deeper-into-ph-waters

 

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(25 mai 2024)

Southeast Asia imbroglio...

 

Thailand wishes to develop an east-west land corridor across the Malay peninsula, just south of Myanmar, while Malaysia is already building something similar from Port Klang, on the Strait of Malacca, to Kuantan, on the South China Sea, but on a longer, less economical, distance.

Both wish to capture a portion of the fast-growing trade between the countries of the European Union, the Middle East and of the Indian subcontinent, and the economic powerhouse of Far East Asia, through the Malacca Strait.

The Malaysian project has two advantages: First, it is using a rail gauge that is very common across most of Eurasia, including China and the EU. Second, it intersects another important transportation corridor, with an enormous potential, from Singapore, at the tip of the Malay peninsula, to the Yunnan, China's southwestern province, through the Mekong valley.

That corridor would be anchored in Singapore, a City-State that is the heart of a giant economic complex including the Malaysian agglomeration of Johor and its surrounding district, and the Indonesian province of Riau. The Yunnan extremity is already linked to the dense transportation network covering most of China's territory, with easy access to Central Asia, Russia, the Middle East, and Europe.

In between Singapore and Yunnan, lies Peninsular Malaysia and the large and populous countries of Thailand and Vietnam, lands that are booming economically, like China and the Indian subcontinent.

All three transportation projects would probably come to life, eventually, in time, despite the high cost of some, given their particular benefits and their relative degree of economic usefulness.

The ASEAN countries are gradually becoming an economic regional powerhouse, located between two demographic colossus, India and China, and sitting astride what may become one day the very nexus of worldwide trade.

https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/economics/article/3264057/malaysia-urges-thailand-revive-pan-asia-rail-links-instead-chasing-landbridge-dream?campaign=3264057&module=perpetual_scroll_0&pgtype=article

 

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(28 mai 2024)

It seems that communities in Myanmar and their lands are increasingly being sacrificed... and used by anglophones countries, the US and the UK, in a tug of war (read: a geopolitical game) against China, those countries having fomented ar artificial civil war between a mix of ethnic minorities and urban westernized youngsters on the one hand and, on the other, the Buddhist majority of that country, indifferent to the Anglo-American cause and being defended by a pro-Chinese military government since a coup a few years ago, the ethnic minorities armies being portrayed as Reaganites freedom fighters...

https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/rare-earth-mining-taking-heavy-toll-in-myanmars-kachin-groups-say.html

 

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(29 mai 2024)

Afin de déstabiliser un pays politiquement et économiquement proche de la Chine, les Anglo-Américains ont encouragé le déclenchement et soutenu le développement de ce qui prend de plus en plus les allures d'une guerre ethnique à grande échelle entre les minorités nationales du Myanmar, dispersées dans les régions périphériques, et le peuple bamar, majoritaire, concentré surtout dans la basse vallée du fleuve Irrawaddy, site d'une agriculture intensive et fortement peuplée. Le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis attendaient beaucoup d'une grande révolution démocratique qui tarde à se manifester contre la "junte" et le "régime", l'actuel gouvernement militaire ayant été mis en place au Myanmar, il y a quelques années, à l'occasion d'un coup organisé sans doute en coordination avec la Chine. Il est vraisemblable que Beijing prendra les moyens nécessaires pour protéger ses acquis et ses investissements dans un pays qui lui assure un débouché sur l'océan Indien, tout en s'interposant entre l'Inde et l'Asie du Sud-Est.

https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmar-junta-rounding-up-civilians-in-rakhine-capital-as-it-braces-for-attack.html

 

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(29 mai 2024)

Thailand has been an important American military ally for decades (and still is), making this move significant, in that it shows how much influence the US has lost in continental Southeast Asia, in the wake of China's rise. The BRICS is an economic grouping and, as such, not a security or military outfit, but it is also a vehicle used by China to trade with whoever wish to trade with it. The whole region of Southeast Asia, both its maritime and its continental portion, much prefer to keep good political and economic relations with its giant neighbor, just like Northeast Asia in the economic field, despite the vigor and intensivity of the American propaganda machine. Vietnam and the Philippines have legitimate security concerns on sections of their surrounding waters, but those will probably be resolved without the shedding of lives, through negociations and discussions about fishing rights and other points of contention. Taiwan is another matter since it is an integral part of Chinese society, temporary divided in two separate parts because of the political turmoil of the last century.

Thailand has been an important American military ally for decades (and still is), making this move significant, in that it shows how much influence the US has lost in continental Southeast Asia, in the wake of China's rise. The BRICS is an economic grouping and, as such, not a security or military outfit, but it is also a vehicle used by China to trade with whoever wish to trade with it. The whole region of Southeast Asia, both its maritime and its continental portion, much prefer to keep good political and economic relations with its giant neighbor, just like Northeast Asia in the economic field, despite the vigor and intensivity of the American propaganda machine. Vietnam and the Philippines have legitimate security concerns on sections of their surrounding waters, but those will probably be resolved without the shedding of lives, through negociations and discussions about fishing rights and other points of contention. Taiwan is another matter since it is an integral part of Chinese society, temporary divided in two separate parts because of the political turmoil of the last century.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/Thailand-aims-to-become-first-Southeast-Asian-BRICS-member

 

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(31 mai 2024)

In plain English: the Anglo-American effort to push Myanmar their way, and out of China's orbit, has failed. The military government was able to protect the main bamar population centers and the democratif revolt didn't materialize, even though the ethnic minorities on the peripheral areas were able to make tangible gains. India has accepted that Myanmar will remain in the orbit of Beijing for the foreseeable future and has started to harden her border to prevent ethnic unrest on her own soil as much as possible. Thailand, on the other hand, while still nominally a US military ally, has just recently decided, being able to see which way the wind is currently blowing in this part of Asia, to join the BRICS economic association, alongside present members China and India. With China-friendly Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar deployed all around it in a semi-circle, Bangkok, quite understandably, prefer to follow the peaceful path of economic growth that the warpath of post-hegemonic powers, unwilling to become a simple pawn in the politico-military machinations concocted in London and Washington. As for Myanmar, a multiethnic mosaic and a failed state ar the same time since its independance, how the bamar majority and the national minorities redefines their political relationships inside the contour of its borders in the coming months or years remain to be seen.

https://www.foreignaffairs.com/burma-myanmar/myanmar-fragmenting-not-falling-apart

 

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(31 mai 2024)

The best way to help the people of Myanmar is for the anglophone countries to stop meddling into its internal affairs for geopolitical reasons having to do with the destabilization of China. Britain and America are using the ethnic minorities of that country the same way they were using 'freedom fighters' in post-Somoza Nicaragua and also mojaheedeens groups in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan. Then, after 9/11, they used that very event as a pretext to invade Irak and Aghanistan themselves, doing more bad than good in the process.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Opinion/West-must-come-to-terms-with-Myanmar-s-fragmentation

 

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(1er jour de juin 2024)

Just like in Myanmar and Ukraine, a few years back, young idealistic Georgian people, their heads brainwashed by decades of American and Western European movies and videos, feeding them polysexual values, wokist ideas, and western social norms, full of dreams about getting incredibly rich and powerful through the use of the English language, the spreading of the American way of life, and the local implantation of Western-style capitalism, are taking the street in Georgian cities to show how much they want to obtain what they see day after day on their smartphones. Most likely, they would have to find their own way in life, like everybody else.

https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/Georgia-passes-pro-Russian-bill-amid-monthlong-youth-protest

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PLUS:  @charles.millar3 (X-Twitter)